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Scholars overlook that Locke has two distinct concepts of equality entrenched in 
his political theory.  By recovering the centrality of natural law in Locke, these 
two concepts of equality can be easily identified.  The first I call “natural 
equality,” which includes every human being regardless of rational capacity, each 
possessing rights to life, liberty, and property.  The second is “law-abiding 
equality,” which includes the subset of people who adequately recognize the 
dictates of natural law.  This distinction is significant because it helps overcome 
the conflict in liberalism between universal dignity and the necessarily 
exclusionary character of citizenship.  
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Human beings all being equal, should the political rights of anyone—e.g. 
voting, jury participation, running for office—ever be restricted within society?1  
Some political scientists say “yes” in cases where democratic ideas are viewed 
with suspicion or even hostility: “as [Robert] Dahl argues, simple insistence on 
the majority formula per se will not do anything until the appropriateness of the 
[political] unit is established” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 27).  Prematurely 
establishing full democratic rights within any given political unit can therefore 
(and unfortunately) increase the probability of democratic failure.   
This piece of empirical prudence, however, lacks a normative framework 
that could mitigate the appearance (or reality) of injustice.  For this very reason, 
restricting rights must raise risky prospects for political order.  Fortunately, a 
justified way of approaching this has been available for some three centuries in 
the theoretical works of John Locke.   
Influential interpretations of Locke today wrongly conclude that equality 
implies full political rights for all (Strauss 1968, 22).  On the other hand, scholars 
that do see limitations on political rights typically view this as a product of 
historical circumstance, including influences of racism, classism (Macpherson 
1962), and/or sexism (Hirschmann 2003).  Opposed to each of these camps, I 
argue that Locke’s political theory limits political rights, but does so in order to 
protect the universal dignity of all, rather than to violate it.  Nor are the criteria for 
granting political rights strictly related to race, class, or gender.  Instead, these 
rights are reserved for those with a sufficient commitment to the belief that 
everyone has equal rights to life, liberty and property. 
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Essential to my argument is that, for Locke, natural law mandates respect 
for rights, and this law is perceptible through reason.  The importance of this 
claim will become apparent in the first section of this paper, where I engage with 
the interpretative stance of Michael Zuckert (1994, 2004, 2005).  I focus on 
Zuckert’s work mainly because it provides the best opportunity to review and 
engage with two popular arguments for equality deeply rooted in Western 
consciousness: (1) that human beings have equal dignity in their possessing of the 
same fundamental capacities, and (2) that nearly all human beings have sufficient 
reasoning capacity for, and thus are entitled to, equal citizenship. 
By carefully reassessing Locke’s views on how the concepts of natural 
law, equality, and rights inter-relate, it can be seen that there are two distinctive 
tiers to his understanding of equality.  I refer to the first of these as “natural 
equality,” which is inclusive of all human beings, even those that reject this 
concept.  This equality implies rights to life, liberty, and property, according to 
Locke.  The second tier of equality is referred to as “law-abiding equality” (LAE), 
which includes the potentially very large subset of people who sufficiently 
recognize and abide by the principles of civility and decency codified in natural 
law.  This awareness, in turn, entrusts law-abiders with the legitimate power and 
duty to punish, a power at the heart of all rights inherently political.  Though 
everyone is entitled to their natural rights to life, liberty, and property, only the 
law-abiding can legitimately secure these rights via the establishment and 
enforcement of positive law. 
Lockean Equality as Self-Ownership 
2 
For Zuckert, Lockean equality is based on the self-ownership one 
naturally enjoys over oneself.2  His interpretation primarily relies on Locke’s 
statement that, “every Man has a Property in his own Person” (ST § 27), 3  
combined with select passages from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
that emphasize man’s nature as a self-aware being (Locke 1975).   
Despite the strengths of this reading, however, there are important 
limitations that warrant consideration.  Primarily, this concept of equality is 
insufficient for going beyond establishing universal dignity to justifying society-
specific political rights.  It this it significantly weakens the coherence of Locke’s 
social compact, which inherently relies on an exclusive membership of citizens.  
That Locke’s compact is “signed” only by those who recognize other “signers” as 
political equals is evidence of this.  This equality also obscures Locke’s clear 
sanctioning of both democratic and undemocratic forms of government in his 
Second Treatise of Government.4   
Let us first examine whether self-ownership is indeed universal—a 
concern posed by James Stoner.  Perhaps this concept in fact points away from 
human equality—both in dignity and political rights—as “surely some people are 
more conscious of themselves than others” (Stoner 2004, 563).  Those that are 
very self-aware might be, under this principle, considered more ‘equal’ or 
dignified than others.  This raises doubts regarding whether this equality can 
satisfactorily support Locke’s main theoretical principles, such as placing 
government’s ultimate power in ‘the people’ as a whole.  Self-aware self-
ownership may instead be a more natural complement to an aristocratic society—
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suggesting that the less self-aware majority may be subordinated to the 
enlightened and philosophic few.   
To this, however, Zuckert responds that, “consciousness of self . . . is not a 
matter of degree” (2004, 569).  What matters is that human beings are conscious 
of themselves at all.  This is the universal and democratic manner in which Locke 
conceives of self-ownership, he argues, and why human beings are each other’s 
equals.   
Zuckert’s reply is a valuable and insightful one.  The self-ownership 
principle does compellingly ground some sort of basic right.  Locke explicitly 
states with regard to the self-owner, “[t]his [property] no Body has any Right to 
but himself” (§ 27).  No one can claim a property right to my individual person 
superior to my inherent ownership thereof.   
Where things get more difficult is in Zuckert’s additional inference that 
this self-conscious self-ownership preserves “the equal rights of all persons” 
(2004, 569).  This is a common inference in discussions of equality, but to suggest 
that ‘a right’ automatically leads to “the equal rights” is a questionable move.  In 
contrast, it would seem perfectly consistent to conclude from self-ownership 
alone that a person indeed has a right to life, but not any additional rights, e.g. 
equal liberty or equal political authority.  This restricted catalogue of rights is 
recognized for incarcerated (and presumably self-owning) criminals, for example.  
Prisoners must have several rights respected as dignity-possessing human beings, 
such as the right to due process of law, protection from cruel and unusual 
punishment, and the like, yet their rights as human beings do not shield them from 
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extensive rights denials imposed on them.  Although the self-ownership principle 
sufficiently grounds our universal rights to not be enslaved, full and equal rights, 
including political rights, are less persuasively accounted for.   
Political rights therefore require more than self-ownership equality.  They 
may potentially be justified through the ability to be rational and/or obedient to 
legitimate laws, and denied to those who lack such ability.  An apocalyptic 
religious group, for example, may seem irrational to its fellow members of 
society.  It may mistreat animals, children, the members themselves, and even 
seriously harm those outside the group.  The members of such a group, an ISIL or 
a Taliban, may reasonably be seen by others in society as rightfully excluded from 
the political process.  Another example would be a violent revolutionary group 
seeking regime change within its nation, such as the FARC inside of Colombia.  
We could consider a large population of undocumented immigrants, as currently 
exists in the United States.  Should such people be allowed the right to vote?  It 
seems only reasonable to expect that reliably law-abiding people within their 
social compact could want more rights than these others.   
These questions help to show that relying on a single concept of equality 
hamstrings Locke’s theory into an all-or-nothing gambit concerning rights.  If 
equal rights emerge out of self-ownership, then the exclusionary social compact 
would seem impossible.  Equality in all rights would amount to a global political 
society.  If self-ownership does not ground political rights for all, then even basic 
equality itself seems thrown into question.   
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We see this playing out in debates over the treatment of undocumented 
immigrants in the U.S.  Since this group is not currently regarded as entitled to the 
equal rights of legal citizens, its members are frequently spoken of in public 
discourse as less than equal simply.  Tellingly, the most draconian calls for mass 
deportation have been accompanied by (often unsubstantiated) charges that 
undocumented immigrants violate many of the basic rights of citizens.  Lawful 
respect for the rights of others dictates equal dignity here, not humanity as such, 
and not self-ownership.  What kind of treatment are they entitled to?  What 
policies should be off limits?  Those barred from political power are left lacking a 
clearly defined ethical status, and are relegated to a vulnerable position.  The 
dispute over what self-ownership may or may not logically imply for equality and 
rights therefore carries major consequences.   
What Stoner illuminates is the complicating matter that human beings are 
quite diverse (both in their abilities and circumstances).  This poses challenges for 
those who wish to establish the recognition of human equality, let alone connect 
such an idea to political power.  Should reason be asserted as equality’s basis, one 
may object that some people reason better than others.  If integrity is asserted, 
then perhaps only those with the most integrity should influence politics.  This 
meritocratic alternative menacingly lingers about, of course with questions 
regarding what defines “merit.”  A ready response, which Zuckert employs, is that 
we ought to first observe that the possession of reason, or integrity, or 
consciousness, or awareness, are all equal in the following sense: we all possess 
them—none of us lack them entirely.  Though this answer raises other questions, 
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it does initially overcome some of the issues threatening the universality of, if not 
all rights, at least basic human dignity.   
In a later piece, Zuckert improves on these weaknesses by claiming that 
for Locke, all normal human beings have “minimal rationality” (2005, 431).  That 
is, most have enough reason to exceed some intellectual threshold, beyond which 
we should all be considered free and equal beings in political society.  This idea 
ambitiously aims at connecting basic human dignity (justified above with self-
ownership) to Locke’s thoughts on liberty attained through the “right reason” of 
mature adulthood.  Not only do all human beings have dignity based on 
possessing reason as such, but they have sufficient reasoning capacity mandating 
a right to political equality.  The addition of the word “minimal” is another 
seemingly minor modification that carries far more weight than may be 
immediately apparent.  We have here, essentially, the missing bridge from 
universal dignity to political rights.  It may not immediately resolve all of the 
problems concerning justifying the exclusivity of the social compact, but it would 
move toward establishing why the members of this contract could or should view 
each other as political equals.  But does it even go this far?  I doubt so, and this is 
the point where Zuckert’s reading of Lockean natural law becomes relevant.   
Generally following the reading of Leo Strauss, Zuckert denies that Locke 
is serious when he speaks of natural law.5  This interpretative stance, aiding the 
establishment of universal equality, raises several theoretical problems.  What 
“minimal rationality” lacks without natural law is a meaningful way to describe 
either the intellectual threshold being minimally exceeded, or the ethical 
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boundaries at work in establishing individual liberty.  Because natural law is put 
aside, it is necessary to assume into the equation an equally meaningful substitute.  
We are left having to ask: to what threshold might ‘minimal rationality’ refer?  
What do you have to be able to know or to do?  To claim that man has enough 
rationality for “freedom,” say, is insufficient: there are many understandings of 
freedom that lead off in radically different theoretical directions, e.g. the standard 
distinction in political theory between positive and negative liberty, or the more 
philosophical distinction between agency and autonomy.   
Whatever the threshold may be, moreover, could not be set too high under 
the single equality thesis.  If dignity is to be universal, then it cannot require much 
by way of means testing.  Consider Forde’s convincing claim that from Locke’s 
objective standpoint, he expects mature adults to at least grasp “the simpler logic 
of equity and civility and of their place in human happiness . . . in tandem with 
acceptable notions of divinity” (2006, 255), and to act in accord with these 
beliefs.  Could such a standard ever be universally met for establishing human 
dignity?  I think not.  Human freedom itself would have to be snuffed out in order 
to achieve such agreement across an entire people, let alone the entire human 
race.  If the threshold is too low, however, we fail to justify that political equality 
in which people are assumed to be aware of various norms and notions of 
civilized society.   
Furthermore, to be unclear on this moral line for Locke’s supposed 
“minimal rationality” is ipso facto to struggle with distinguishing between 
categories fundamental to law and politics, such as child and adult, citizen and 
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non-citizen, oppressor and oppressed, or just and unjust.  Who is who?  The 
conventional reading of the Second Treatise suggests that, a person’s obedience to 
natural law, or capital ‘R’ Reason, answers many of these vexing questions.  Such 
human distinctions legitimize power relationships—an adult’s directing of his or 
her children’s lives, the community’s punishment of criminals, and just law-
making within civil society.  For each of these, the distinction needs to be drawn 
between different statuses of human beings in relation to their ability and 
willingness to exercise “right reason.”  Taking natural law out of Locke’s political 
theory leaves behind a major theoretical gap, which ‘minimal rationality’ does not 
sufficiently supply. 
 Some sense of the interpretational alternatives relative to Lockean natural 
law is helpful to have here.  Consider, for example, John Dewey’s representative 
pre-Strauss reading: for Locke, “Reason is a remote majestic power that discloses 
ultimate truths” (2000, 29).  Under this view, Reason could not be more foreign to 
minimal rationality, which at bottom seems to mean for Zuckert a version of 
instrumental rationality, completely purged of perceptions of ethical truths.   
 Jeremy Waldron offers another influential interpretation of Lockean 
equality, making an interesting and warranted effort to address the normative 
weaknesses of accounts of Lockean equality like Zuckert’s (2002, 2005).  In his 
own words, Waldron interprets Lockean equality as grounded in “the capacity to 
form and manipulate abstract ideas, which enables a person to reason to the 
existence of God and to the necessity of finding out what if anything God requires 
of him” (2002, 83).  This seeks to be an egalitarian account of the human 
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condition in that every human being can presumably abstract from particulars, 
conceive of an idea of God, and contemplate it.  This formulation supports at least 
some of Locke’s broader theory.  Governments should not interfere with anyone’s 
basic moral standing under God and his or her pursuit of personal salvation.  
However, it is doubtful that this understanding is entirely satisfactory.6   
 Zuckert himself identifies many of Waldron’s most significant problems, 
the most important of which concerns the ethical implications for this natural 
faculty, the ability to think of God and discern the duties owed, which only has 
potential use.  There is indeed an extreme unlikelihood that this faculty would 
experience universal use among all human beings in real life (Zuckert 2005, 426-
30).  Something that human beings can merely do potentially serves as a 
discomfortingly weak theoretical basis for equality, dignity, and rights.  It is thus 
not, it seems, particularly useful to contemporary discussions of equality, nor is it 
likely the product of a mind such as Locke’s.  
If Zuckert is right about natural law, then equality will admittedly need to 
be married to some other set of normatively substantive criteria.  The key problem 
is that the secular criteria proposed—self-ownership and minimal rationality—
have been shown to be insufficient.  Normative criteria such as Waldron’s, which 
relies on God, promises to be more substantial, but then flounders under the 
familiar problem of non-universality.  
For Locke, the main complicating factor for universal respect for rights, 
which Zuckert relies on to argue against natural law, has to do with an 
individual’s choice of whether or not to be self-governed by reason; “Men being 
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biased by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of [the law of 
nature]” (§ 124).  Some men will not restrain themselves by the law of nature, 
even perhaps if they can perceive it, and will unjustly harm others.  Others will 
not see the law of nature correctly because of self-interested bias, or because they 
fail to spend enough time “studying” it.  There will consequently be cases where a 
lack of self-restraint is evident, and force will be wrongly used against others.  
These are difficult problems for any theory of equality and universal rights.  But 
do they necessarily imply that the natural law does not exist?   
Surely not.  In the state of nature or in civil society, there is a knowable 
natural law, perceivable by reasonable people, setting ethical boundaries on the 
actions of human beings.  There will always emerge a clear division between 
people who perceive and respect natural law and the rights it dictates on one side, 
and those who either do not perceive, do not obey, or both, on the other.  There 
therefore is directly contrary Zuckert’s assertion, an implicit need for natural 
rights to be enforced by “good men” through “good means” (1994, 237).  
Lockean equality must, therefore, somehow be made compatible with these 
postulations, or be deemed untenable.  It is not valid to assume away natural law 
in support of equality simply because it creates this normatively salient division, 
which indeed does effectively amount to a type of inequality. 
Let us apply this discussion to a real world example.  We have seen 
Western powers overthrow dictatorships, sometimes in defense of people’s rights.  
Iraq, Libya, and Syria come to mind.  In efforts to subsequently erect a unity 
government, some of the people (may, let us assume) want a patriarchal 
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theocracy, others military rule, others retribution and civil war.  Not everyone will 
see each other as free and equal members of a new social compact.  Yet, rule of 
law must be established, so what is to be done?  If we appeal to self-ownership 
equality, we should invite every mature adult residing within the territorial 
borders into the political system.  We may justify doing so because people, under 
this view, are entitled to equal rights as self-owners and are minimally rational.  
This course, however, would seem to portend violence.  Even resulting stability 
could, depending on the particular rules established, confirm the suspicions of 
sexism and classism in Locke’s theory lodged by scholars such as Hirschmann 
and Macpherson.  Namely, that Locke’s theory protects and institutionalizes the 
unjust power inequalities that prevail within the broad legal boundaries of civil 
society.7   
Fortunately, I think the above analysis of equality has begun to prefigure 
the means of saving Lockean liberalism from such conclusions.  Beyond human 
beings’ “like faculties,” we consistently find an ethically important distinction 
between those who abide by natural law and those who do not.  In drawing this 
distinction, the population of law-abiders may indeed in some countries, at some 
times, not look the same as the general population.  But as the example from the 
previous paragraph shows, when this is the case, the cause may at least formally 
be traceable to a flaw in the original compact.  This flaw could result in a serious 
moral indictment of the original compactors and the prevailing powers-that-be as 
unlawful, illegitimate, and harmful.8  And here we should not forget that Locke’s 
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theory does include a right to violent revolution under such circumstances (§ 
220). 
Defining and Locating Locke’s Two Equalities 
By restoring natural law to a central place in Locke’s thought, we can 
quickly begin to see Locke’s implicit understanding of equality.  There are, in 
fact, two tiers of equality working together in Locke’s political theory grounding 
a just political society.  The first I call natural equality, to which Locke includes 
every human being, regardless of manifested rational capacity, each possessing 
natural rights to life, liberty, and property.  The second is law-abiding equality 
(LAE), which includes the potentially large subset of people who adequately 
recognize and abide by the dictates of natural law through their matured reason.  
Such people meet the normative prerequisites for full and equal political rights, 
whether they are members of an existing social compact, seeking to join, or in 
need of establishing a new compact entirely.9 
Let us look at the key passages in the Second Treatise for the evidence that 
this distinction is authentically Lockean.  We will find that natural equality is not 
directly derived from man’s being God’s creation.  What it does depend on, 
rather, is the presumption of God, allowing equality to be presented deductively 
as a rational maxim of natural law.  The distinction here is between claiming 
equality under God simply versus an inference of mankind’s inherent equality, 
under God.  These two ways of arriving at natural equality are often confused 
with each other, but the latter’s approach is far more akin to a “rational truth” than 
a “revealed truth.”   
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Locke reasons that there is, “nothing more evident, than that Creatures of 
the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of 
Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst 
another without Subordination or Subjection” (§ 4).  The subordination forbidden 
under this passage is, “that [which] may Authorize us to destroy one another” (§ 
6).  Despotic power cannot be legitimately exercised between members all 
participating in these four common conditions: species, rank, advantages of 
Nature, and use of same faculties.  This is a far cry from simply claiming that 
human beings are all equal in the eyes of God.  Natural equality is instead derived 
from an empirical judgment that human beings are created with these evident 
similarities.  Being similar, and otherwise ignorant of divine grants to superior 
stations, men ought not to be arbitrarily subordinated to other men.  To assume 
otherwise is to risk divine punishment, once again indicating the need to presume 
God’s existence (see e.g. § 176).  This argument for natural equality incorporates 
worldly reasoning with a sort of pragmatic theology (cf. Forde 2001), which 
consequently entitles each of us to our own persons against the forceful designs of 
others. 
Although Locke may seem vague here, this particular construction bridges 
the problem of species identification from the Essay 10 with practical concerns of 
politics.  The very vagueness surrounding natural equality allows Locke to 
minimize when a particular creature could ever be supposed unworthy of 
recognition as an equal human being.  If Locke were to have specified, for 
example, that a creature receives the equal dignity of a human being by virtue of 
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his or her skill with abstract reasoning, then philosophers may seemingly rule by 
right over non-philosophers.  What Locke instead combines in this class of equal 
creatures is biological pedigree, a common environment, and supposed access to 
the same faculties.  It is a straightforward task to draw similarities here with 
Zuckert’s self-ownership based equality.  We are all self-owners, in that we 
possess the same capacities (access to reason, self-awareness) that support self-
ownership, and a strong standard of moral recognition flows from this 
commonality.  The unbridged space between Zuckert’s account and Locke’s 
natural equality is that Locke views the presumption of God to be necessary for 
such reasoning to hold up (see e.g. ST, ch. 2).11  
The supposition of universal human access to the same faculties is 
therefore a deceivingly powerful construction.  It obstructs anything like slavery 
or racial genocide based on the inherent superior faculties of one group over 
another.  Biological species membership is also much easier to determine, 
because this criterion mainly relies on outward appearance.  We know from the 
Second Treatise’s chapter on parental power that even if some faculties never 
manifest in a child, there is still a duty to take care of him or her by virtue of this 
ineradicable supposition tied to biological species membership.  This in some 
ways brings us full circle to the more common, nearly ubiquitous idea of human 
equality today: human beings are equal by virtue of their common humanity.  
While Locke agrees with this to a certain extent, his view is stronger in its 
theoretical implications for incorporating the ethically significant criterion of 
access to the “use of the same faculties.”   
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Locke’s justification for natural equality grounded in shared human 
dignity has now been described.  But how does he get from the natural equality of 
human beings to a legitimate polity of law-abiders within a social compact?  What 
makes a person a law-abider?  To answer this, Locke’s account of parental and 
despotic power is essential, as it demonstrates the centrality of rational maturity to 
justifying and directing each of these powers.  Who is able to legitimately 
exercise these powers, who is subject to them, and why?  The answers require 
recognizing law-abiding equality (LAE), Locke’s implicitly described second tier 
of equality.   
First, one must be a law-abider in order to be a legitimate parent or 
guardian.  Parental power entails “a sort of Rule and Jurisdiction [parents have] 
over [their children]” (§ 55).  It “arises from that Duty which is incumbent on 
them, to take care of their Off-spring, during the imperfect state of Childhood” (§ 
58).  As opposed to the artificial compact that gives rise to political power, 
“Nature gives” parental power (§ 173).  However, “the bare act of begetting” does 
not warrant nature’s endowment of parental power, but rather it goes to whoever 
gives the child their entitled “Nourishment and Education” (§ 65).  It does seem, 
as an aside, that it is primarily the natural parents who possess “a tenderness for 
their Off-spring” (§ 67, see also §§ 63, 170), but this fact is non-essential to the 
power itself.  Rather, this simply “makes evident, that this [parental power] is not 
intended to be a severe Arbitrary Government, but only for the Help, Instruction, 
and Preservation” (§ 170) of children.  This claim is crucial, because it implies 
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that parental power never can unilaterally change into despotic power, which in 
turn signals the moral status of children in the care of parents or guardians.   
Parental power is not exclusively exercised over children, but also 
“Lunaticks,” “Ideots,” “Innocents,” and “Madmen” (§ 60).  He who “comes not to 
such a degree of Reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the 
Law, and so living within the Rules of it” (§ 60) needs to be under the parental 
authority of a “Free man” (§ 60).  A free man is a person where “Age and 
Education [has] brought him Reason and Ability to govern himself, and others” (§ 
61).  This “freedom . . . is grounded on his having Reason, which is able to 
instruct him in that [Natural] Law he is to govern himself by” (§ 63).  If this 
condition does not come, then he is “continued under the Tuition and Government 
of others, all the time his own Understanding is uncapable of that Charge” (§ 60). 
LAE is thus what authorizes a parent to exercise his or her authority in 
raising a child.  How is it a form of equality?  In the sense that parents have equal 
jurisdiction—to say society’s best parents have a right to raising everyone’s 
children is anathema to Locke’s theory.   
Raising a child to be law-abiding is the end to which his or her upbringing 
should be directed.  Prior to the attainment of LAE, children possess by virtue of 
their species membership the natural equality afforded to all human beings under 
Reason and God.  But is there then a potential condition here between childhood 
and the full state of maturity?  Yes.  Locke describes this as “a state as wretched, 
and as much beneath that of a Man” as “brutes” (§ 63).  This is because the 
unbounded rules of the passions are not consistent with human freedom or 
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equality.  Locke states that, “To turn him loose to an unrestrain’d Liberty, before 
he has Reason to guide him, is not allowing him the priviledge of his Nature, to be 
free” (§ 63).12   
Calling freedom “the priviledge of his Nature” is revealed as the logical 
complement to his earlier remark stipulating the “the full state of Equality” that 
children “are not born in . . . though they are born to it” (§ 55).  Equality in this 
context clearly emerges as a teleological concept, one constituted of “that equal 
Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom” (§ 54).  Maturity is not a 
natural function of simply getting older, but rather comes from a willfully 
provided education from a good parent, who must be a Freeman (a law-abiding 
equal).   
Full equality, however, still can once attained later be forfeited by unjust 
appeals to force.13  Those who participate in unlawful aggression no longer carry 
the presumption of potential rationality as children do by nature.  Locke thus 
speaks of “Captives” (§ 172), who become so as an “effect only of Forfeiture” by 
“having quitted Reason” (§ 172).  This is “the state of War continued,” and results 
in the need for authority “which neither Nature gives . . . nor Compact can 
convey” (§ 172).  The crucial difference between the “Captive” and the child is 
that where a child needs help “manag [-ing] his property,” the captive has “no 
property at all” (§ 173).  That is, he is “not Master of his own Life” (§ 172); not a 
self-owner,14 yet still “a Man” (§ 172).  A new compact cannot be negotiated 
between the victim and the captured aggressor because compacts require the use 
of reason, which the aggressor has demonstrated a willingness to give up or reject. 
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Even this openly unequal despotic relationship is mediated by justice, and 
Locke’s principle of natural equality is always maintained.  If Locke seems to 
condone severity, then this should be seen simply as the necessary result of not 
being able to restore peace between an injured person and an aggressor by either 
natural forces (as with children) or compact (as among reasonable adults).  
Absolute15 power necessarily has to fill this void.  What else can be done?  If the 
injured party releases the criminal, he risks his later destruction by holding society 
with an unreasonable aggressor.  Should he have to rehabilitate the criminal back 
to reasonableness?  Such a warrant cannot easily be presumed, nor should the 
paradoxical conclusion be made that an aggressor deserves more service from 
their victim than an innocent child does his or her parent.  In all cases, the law of 
nature still governs the actions of the Freeman, who has both a right (§ 11) and an 
obligation (§ 6) to preserve all mankind.  The Freeman must remember that, “he 
will answer at a Tribunal, that cannot be deceived, and will be sure to retribute to 
every one according to the Mischiefs he hath created to his Fellow-Subjects; that 
is, any part of Mankind” (§ 176, emphasis mine).   
The two tiered understanding of equality carries many advantages over the 
alternatives proposed by Locke scholars.  The former accounts for the various 
power relations among mankind, demarcated by the presence or absence of 
reasonable law-abiding self-ownership, while strengthening and mediating with 
dignity and justice the power relationships between the free and the un-free that 
emerge as a result.  It provides a vocabulary and ethical structure in which to 
understand the relationships between those who honor and respect human equality 
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and those who do not, and to judge what rights and duties preside in these 
dynamics. 
Political Significance of Two Equalities 
Scholars have supposed these two forms of equality to be the same, and 
consequently either downplay (e.g., Zuckert 1994) or ineffectively struggle with 
(e.g., Waldron 2002) the central issue: combining dignity on one side with the 
matured reason (natural law) basis for social compact membership on the other.  
The thesis that there are two-tiers to equality, described above, surmounts this 
major theoretical obstacle.16  It provides a clearer blueprint for the types of 
political institutions that are called for in a Lockean political society.  It also 
clarifies other persistent ambiguities having to do with whether human beings 
naturally come to the age of maturity (viz., not without a particular kind of 
education and guidance).  Finally, this thesis illuminates the broader distinction 
between political rights—especially suffrage—and private rights which animate 
social disputes throughout political history and around the world today. 
It has been shown that LAE is not a one-way graduation out of basic 
equality.  Rather, LAE can be forfeited—in some cases for a time, in others 
permanently—depending on the nature and the circumstances of the rights 
violation perpetrated.  LAE thus can be lost from one moment to the next, but also 
can be reinstated.  In this it is important to see that there is an objective aspect to 
this form of equality, and a subjective aspect.  To understand who qualifies and 
who does not, we need to consider whether an individual abides by natural law.  
This judgment is limited by our limited abilities to know the truth, i.e. our 
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fallibility.  Who can see into the heart of another?  Yet all societies form justice 
systems to make these kinds of determinations.  Those who are living freely 
participate in LAE from society’s subjective perspective, while those who are 
undergoing some form of punishment do not.   
It could of course be the case that rights-violating people, including those 
obeying the unjust laws of tyrannical governments, could be viewed by their 
regime as “law-abiding.”  Such people would not qualify for LAE, given Locke’s 
absolutist ideas regarding rights.  Such people, in extreme cases, may be indicted 
by rights-respecting countries for prosecution in international courts, and/or face a 
military intervention from a foreign power. 
This leads us to consider the fast diversity of belief systems around the 
world, some of which deny basic equality and human rights.  Subscribers to such 
beliefs would be unsuitable to wield political power, according to Locke.  Those 
who harbor beliefs that purport to justify the enslavement or oppression of one 
group over another are certainly not participants in LAE, and are not suitable to 
enter into a social compact at all, with anyone.  Certainly some forms of radical 
religious ideology would fall into this category.  A compact among such people 
would be an association, but an association completely devoid of legitimate 
political power.   
Recall that for Locke, government must rule by consent of a people that 
have formed a legitimate social compact with each other.  He states that 
government’s power arises from “Voluntary Agreement . . . [which] gives 
Political Power to Governours for the Benefit of their Subjects, to secure them in 
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the Possession and Use of their Properties” (§ 173).  What does this mean?  He 
states earlier, “that, which begins and actually constitutes any Political Society, is 
nothing but the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority to unite 
and incorporate into such a Society” (§ 99, see also § 117).  Later he speaks of the 
social compact as the “Act therefore, whereby any one unites his Person, which 
was before free, to any Commonwealth” (§ 120).   
The words “Freemen” and “free” have two separate implications here, 
each of which is essential to understand.  First, men already explicitly contracted 
into one political society are not free to voluntarily enter into another, and are 
“perpetually and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a Subject” to 
their original commonwealth.17  Second, the term “Freemen” also connotes man’s 
natural freedom, which requires the attainment of a “State of Maturity wherein he 
might be suppos’d capable to know . . . [the] Law [of nature]” (§ 59).   
It has been shown that outside full equality are both children and those 
adults who either reject or are ignorant of the basic principles of natural law.  
Indeed, the existence of such adults is precisely what leads to the need for 
political society by explicit social compact in the first place.  Locke states that, 
“were it not for the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, there would be 
no need of any other [community than] . . . this great and natural community of 
mankind” (§ 128).  In other words, the social compact is made necessary by the 
distinction between corrupt men and the LAE of Freemen.   
Moreover, we can infer that societies can corrupt their people.  He uses the 
classical polity-as-organism metaphor to describe political power as, “a Power to 
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make Laws . . . as may tend to the preservation of the whole, but cutting off those 
Parts, and those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound and 
healthy” (§ 171).  Even inside the social compact, corruption is not permanently 
rooted out, but requires constant attention through the propagation and 
enforcement of natural law, by Free-men.18  This work is carried out through 
parental guidelines, the education system, the immigration system, and the 
establishment of treaties that politically bond those societies that recognize each 
other as reasonable and trustworthy. 
This law is not instinct, but reason, which most importantly tells “who will 
but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another 
in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions” (§ 6).  Perception of the law of nature 
involves active belief in human rights.  Thus, only those who have some sense of 
human rights have the functional capability, and the will, to manifest respect for 
rights.  These are Locke’s “Freemen capable of a majority to unite and 
incorporate” (§ 99), who clearly are, when one looks around the globe at any 
point in history, in a non-universal group.  These men do not need to be experts in 
the natural law or in legislation themselves.  What Locke has in mind is for this 
group to erect a just government, which may or may not be a democratic one (§ 
132).  They thus need to be “capable of a majority” having authority and capacity 
under the social compact to erect “lawful government” (§ 99), as opposed to non-
Freemen who would be incapable of establishing sufficient consent.   
It is challenging to infer a great deal about Locke’s constitutional 
thought,19 but the guiding principles and goals are there to be considered.  An 
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example he provides of a legitimate social compact is portrayed in Josephus 
Acosta’s account of the peoples of America.  There in America, Locke states, 
“these Men, ‘tis evident, were actually free . . . [and] by consent equal, till by the 
same consent they set Rulers over themselves” (§ 102, emphasis mine).  Those 
reasonable individuals that perceive the natural law are the very same who are 
able to join together politically, viewing each other as free and equal beings to 
erect lawful government.  Their equality in reason, or LAE, like the broader 
natural law itself, exists independently of recognition, but is also in need of 
acknowledgement to be given real-world political effect.20   
Although Locke recognizes under-development and corruption among 
some human beings, he is indeed quite careful to circumscribe the implications.  
This is especially so with regard to children, even those who have parents or 
caretakers that give no heed to the basic rights of human beings.  He reaffirms as 
much when he states that, “Children, whatever may have happened to their 
Fathers, are [nevertheless] Free-men” (§ 189).  Children are afforded certain 
moral presumptions regardless of their parents’ beliefs or actions.   
This aspect of Locke’s theory perhaps still poses some residual challenge 
to my interpretation.  There is the possibility that maturity could be, for Locke, 
the effect of natural processes.  If nature alone bestows reason, rather than as a 
matter of education and breeding, parents need only avoid corrupting their 
children’s natural development.  Upon reaching a certain age, all children should 
be automatically and naturally provided the presumption of rationality, and hence 
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full political rights.  In this sense, children develop into law-abiding equals 
naturally, because they can do so quite reliably.   
I strongly reject this view.  Crucial to keep in mind are the environmental 
distinctions between nature and civil society that influence human development, 
values, and attitudes.  Certainly, in healthy societies, presuming all children to 
eventually develop rationality often works as practical public policy, and is 
consistent with the natural innocence that Locke ascribes to children.  But such 
development would be due to the just laws aiming to ensure that children are 
raised to abide by natural law (which has been outlined above).  The political 
lesson should therefore point to properly instituting educational institutions in 
society in that the best way to avoid social corruption is to prevent it, rather than 
to treat an unwieldy outbreak of it.   
Indeed, it is in the context of healthy societies that matured reason comes 
closest to sounding like a natural function.  Locke mentions, for example, that an 
adult’s liberty is derived from consciously operating within the boundaries of 
English law.  “What made him free . . .?  A capacity of knowing that Law.  Which 
is supposed by that Law, at the Age of one and twenty years, and in some cases 
sooner” (§ 59).  In this case, Locke is making a conceptual point; that his notion 
of a “State of Maturity” (§ 59) is not artificial, or even unusual, because it is 
acknowledged under existing statute.  This should not, in contrast, be interpreted 
as meaning that human beings all naturally acquire reason-based LAE by age 
twenty-one.  Locke is simply showing here that an evident distinction exists 
between the freedom of mature adults and the unbounded liberty of immature 
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human beings, usually (see ST, chs. 2, 15), but not always (see §§ 60, 172), being 
a condition confined to childhood.  These passages therefore merely point to the 
kind of political environment that Locke has in mind to perpetuate healthy 
society, but not that matured “right reason” naturally develops unerringly.   
Conclusion 
This essay began by noting the scientific finding that, “complex 
negotiations, pacts, and possibly territorial realignments and consociational 
agreements are often necessary before the majority formula will be accepted as 
legitimately binding” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 27).  I have since tried to show the 
manner in which Locke’s theory could provide the guiding normative 
complement to such an empirical claim.  The key issue is for members of the 
social compact to all acknowledge the natural equality of human beings, their 
equal dignity, and their natural rights.  The people for whom they legislate need 
not be so sure, for they might otherwise wage wars of retribution and/or conquest 
based on past grievances and competing political visions.  The people within the 
territory and excluded from political power need only consent to abide by the 
rules put in place by their rights-respecting leaders.  Erecting government instead 
on force and will would likely threaten the rights of at least some, if not all.   
Because Locke views children as naturally susceptible to accepting his 
rights doctrine, such rights constriction could indeed only be permissible for a 
time—namely, until rights-rejecting ideology and/or prejudices can be learned out 
of society.  It would depend on the wisdom and justice of those entrusted with 
political power to ensure that the population of members abiding by natural law 
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increases and that political rights are likewise expanded to all those legitimately 
entitled to them.  
Though this interpretation of Locke’s theory may seem a stretch to some, I 
leave any skeptics with the following consideration: given the opening 
propositions of the Second Treatise, the two-tiered equality thesis is difficult, if 
impossible, to logically avoid.  With the invocation of a natural law, knowable 
through reason, and defining political power as enforcement of this law, Locke 
forever separates basic equality from the particular manifestations of mind and 
character necessary to the consistent and reliable facilitation of it.  One tried way 
of getting around such a conclusion is to reject Locke’s explicit assumption of 
natural law.  Yet, as has been shown, the political component substantially 
weakens in its logical coherence as a result.  The interpretation here, in contrast, 
offers new insights into why democracy not only cannot be, but should not be, 
hastily instituted.  It does this while affirming what all Locke scholars agree on, 
that legitimate government must be grounded in respect for basic rights and 






1 This question points away from other debates on equality over the just 
distribution of goods among legal and political equals.  Walzer (1983, 62), for 
example, rejects that members of society can be excluded from citizenship: “the 
rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over strangers, is probably the most 
common form of tyranny in human history.”  Exclusivity seems to be legitimately 
justified for Walzer only by denying territorial admittance to prospective 
immigrants.  There is a prudential claim he makes that widely sharing political 
power is safer than not sharing, but this assumes more than explains the normative 
justification for anyone—let alone everyone—wielding political power in the first 
place.  
2 This is a consistent, long-held position.  See Zuckert (1994, chs. 8-9; Cf. Stoner 
(2004), Zuckert (2005, 2004, 2002).  Here, I will be focusing on the critiques of 
Zuckert’s position by Stoner (2004) and Waldron (2005).  For more perspective 
on the general debate, see also Waldron (2002).  Cf. Dunn (1967) and Dunn’s 
(1997) review of Zuckert (1994). 
3 Henceforth, this work will be cited as ST, by section number in the text. 
4 Locke is frequently cagey about towards democracy—see e.g., ST, chap. 10; see 
also Grant (1987, 190). 
5 Strauss portrays Locke as “a crypto-Hobbesian hedonist” in the words of 
Sigmund (2005, 407). 
6 See the ‘Symposium on God, Locke, and Equality’, The Review of Politics, 
(Summer 2005) 
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7 Cf. Hirschmann (2003, 48): Both women and the poor “are excluded from 
political power and freedom because of a lack of rationality.”  Hirschmann (2003, 
42) also summarizes Macpherson as arguing that, “Locke attributed different 
natural abilities to people by virtue of their class and that poverty was a sign of 
natural irrationality.”  
8 Cf. Ta-Nehisi Coates’ influential article, “The Case for Reparations,” in which 
the author begins his essay with three quotations, one of which is taken from 
Locke’s Second Treatise, citing the right of anyone who has been damaged by the 
actions of an unlawful person to seek retribution.   
9 It has long been observed that the basis for legitimacy and popular obligation for 
Locke may lie more in the goodness of government than in the presence of 
consent.  See especially Pitkin (1966).  Central to this thesis is Locke’s discussion 
of tacit consent (ST, § 119-122), which can be interpreted as amounting to little-
to-no consent at all.  Indeed, even bad government could still warrant obedience 
(or what might be called tacit consent) short of ‘a long train of Abuses’ (§ 225).  
This discussion, though related to the present study, misses how Locke 
understands the formation and preservation of good government. 
10 Locke struggled with philosophically identifying what a ‘human being’ is it its 
essence, and what should be implied by the term.  For some discussion of this, see 
e.g. Waldron (2002, 49-63), Ward (2010, 50-53), P. Myers (1998, 50-53); Cf. 
Locke, Essay 3:5-6. 
11 Cf. C. Taylor (1989, 241): “God has to exist for humans to give some order to 
their life.  That is why Locke was induced to except atheists from his otherwise 
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wide rule of toleration.  Such people had spurned the very basis of human civil 
life.”  See also Waldron (2002, 13): “I actually don’t think it is clear that we — 
now — can shape and defend an adequate conception of basic equality apart from 
some religious foundation.” 
12 This category may in fact constitute something of a third-tier of equality below 
the two being described here, which space limitations unfortunately preclude me 
from exploring. 
13 For Waldron’s Locke, a criminal “forfeits his moral status of freedom and 
equality” (2002, 143).  Waldron continues: “This position of Locke’s is highly 
problematic and in my view it is not carefully thought out . . . I certainly don’t 
know how to reconcile it with the background theory of basic equality.”  
Separating basic equality from the full equality of law-abiders would seem to 
provide a solution. 
14 This highlights the subtle fact that self-ownership is not the same as self-hood 
for Locke, marking the distinction between being a person entitled to individual 
freedom implying property rights and being a person simply.   
15 See ST, § 139 on the distinction between absolute and arbitrary power.  
Absolute power is “still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which 
required it in some Cases.”  It is unclear whether Locke’s later blurring of these 
two concepts in § 172 is intentional.  More likely, it is capturing the difficulty of 
securing justice inside such relationships. 
16 It is perhaps incumbent upon the author to give an idea as to why Locke was 
not clearer about these two equalities. My considered position is that Locke’s 
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genuine egalitarianism left him averse to excluding anyone from the full and 
complete dignity of a human being.  The difficulty with leaving equality as a 
basic universal concept is that in political society, for this dignity to be respected, 
not everyone can be trusted with political power.  Some unfortunately want to 
violate the rights of others.  This problem of self-love, ignorance, and bias forced 
him to establish the criteria that could justify the wielding of political power, 
which logically resulted in the two tiered equality described.  Locke does, as has 
been discussed, use the suggestive terminology of a “full state of equality” (§ 55). 
17 A third form of ownership seems to emerge here, beyond divine and self-
ownership, between the society and the citizen.  Regarding the supposed 
centrality of self-ownership found in Zuckert’s interpretation, this seems to pose 
another complicating factor. 
18 Cf. Ward (2010, 193): “Locke presents epistemic autonomy not as a realistic 
goal only of a few, but as a cultural expectation of liberal society.” 
19 Cf. Ward’s (2010, 131) overview of this difficult area in Locke studies. 
20 I will also recall to the reader the United States Founders who once collectively 
asserted that, “We hold these truths to be self-evident.” This revered clause is 
illuminated by the two equalities thesis.  It implicitly acknowledges both forms of 
equality argued for, distinguished by the crucial Lockean criterion for what makes 
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